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Abstract
Linda Zagzebski has recently proposed an ethical theory, based in virtue ethics, that
builds in an essential role for God as an exemplar and thus the source of moral motivation. In
this thesis, I examine Zagzebski’s Divine Motivation theory and argue that it fails to adequately
meet the criteria for an ethical theory. I sketch out an alternative that leaves an essential role for
God while avoiding the pitfalls of Zagzebski’s theory.

I.

Introduction
Some ethical theories, particularly modern ones, have been constructed in order to stand

independently, without the need for a God. Difficulties such as moral relativism and lack of
motivation to act morally arise with such a separation of God and ethics, but many philosophers
would rather wrestle with these issues than tie religion closely to morality. Divine Command
theory (DC) is an exception, because it is an ethical theory that derives from an omnipotent God,
and is meaningless without God. However, DC has some gaping holes revealed by the Euthyphro
dilemma. An alternative ethical theory that needs God at its foundation would enhance the
discussion.
This thesis will examine Linda Zagzebski’s recent combination of virtue ethics and
theology into her own ethical theory: Divine Motivation theory (DM). Zagzebski’s goal in
crafting DM was first to create a secular virtue ethics based on the human desire to imitate. She
then works out what such a framework would be like if the Christian God were the one to be
imitated. She argues that DM accounts for human moral behavior and also accurately describes

1

the relationship between God and his creation. DM is a unique solution to an old problem.
Zagzebski’s approach is compelling in that it neatly sidesteps the Euthyphro dilemma as well as
the problem of evil. It is a versatile ethical theory that is not necessarily grounded in religious
dogma, yet it can easily be applied to any religion.
However, DM is not a perfect solution. It makes many descriptive claims, but is not
prescriptive, and therefore does not seem to fit the criterion of an ethical theory at all. Even
granting its status as an ethical theory, it is difficult to see how value judgments can be made,
including judgments as to who is a good person and what is a good action. These problems arise
as Zagzebski makes assumptions about emotions that seem to contradict reality.
Despite its shortcomings, DM does exactly what Zagzebski intended it to do: create a
real-world, virtue-based ethical theory that brings God and religion back into the discussion. This
is an important task, and I contribute my own ideas towards that goal. Moral decision-making
can be narrowed down to one prescription: love. Understanding this, I begin to outline a new
theistically based ethical theory.

II. Building the Divine Motivation Theory

Resistance to theistically based moral theories
Most contemporary philosophers do not build God into the foundation of their ethical
theory, despite the compelling reasons outlined later. The most obvious reason for this would be
the fact that the average modern philosopher does not believe in God.1 Zagzebski also claimed
that:
[Another] reason for resistance to the idea that morality needs religion is political. We
live in a world of many religions, so if morality depends on religion, on which religion
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does it depend?...In a liberal, pluralistic society religion is a matter of choice; a large area
of morality is not.2

The Euthyphro dilemma pinpoints tension within ethical theories that take omnipotent
gods as their basis, further undermining support for theistically based ethical theories. The
dilemma asks whether God or the good is metaphysically prior. Proposing an ethical theory
without God declaring things good is an attractive alternative to puzzling over the dilemma.
Zagzebski takes a familiar approach to easing the resistance to a theistically based ethical
theory: “This problem would be solved if morality has a two-tier grounding—one in God, the
other in nature. That is the approach of the historically important theory of Natural Law.”3
Zagzebski by no means advocates for Natural Law, calling it “fundamentally an ethic of
obligation,” in her book, whereas she is after “an ethic of the good.”4

Why propose a theistically based ethical theory?
Given that theistic ethical theories are not widely discussed, a natural question is why one
would propose and defend a theistic ethical theory—one that gives a significant role to God or
religion—in the first place. Zagzebski addresses this concern in various places. For example, in
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, she writes that: “Morality needs religion. And
one respect in which it is said that morality needs religion is that the goal of the moral life is
unreachable without religious practice.”5
Presumably Zagzebski is referring to specifically religious activities that make living a
moral life forefront in the mind, or provide accountability: for Catholics, this might mean going
to confession; for Muslims, this might mean fasting during Ramadan. Religious practices such as
these, it can be argued, facilitate a moral life. In a similar vein, she also notes that “some
2
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religious philosophers maintain that morality needs religion in at least two other respects: (1) to
provide moral motivation, and (2) to provide morality with its foundation and justification.”6
From this perspective, a secular ethical theory lacks the motivational power of a theistic
approach. This, of course, is an empirical claim—but one with quite a lot of empirical support in
its favor. Also telling is the second claim: that morality requires religion for “its foundation and
justification.” Here the thought is that secular ethical theories have traditionally had trouble
defending, in a non-circular fashion, their most fundamental commitments and imperatives. As a
result, secular ethical theory has been haunted by relativism and subjectivism. In other words, the
normative aspirations of an ethical theory have been difficult to achieve within philosophical
frameworks that aspire to be scientifically and naturalistically respectable. Or, as Zagzebski
writes: “One important set of arguments that morality needs religion or that moral theory needs
theology holds that there is a goal or point to morality, and that point is inexplicable within a
naturalistic, autonomous moral theory.”7
Beyond these specific points, however, there’s a more general consideration. Given the
diversity already present in contemporary ethical theory, and given the ever-present challenge of
relativism and subjectivism, it is in our interest to explore all the options, including theistic
options. Ethical theories—including consequentialist, deontological, and virtue theories—all
come with costs and benefits well known to their detractors and defenders. In this context it
makes good sense to re-examine theistic theories as well.

Divine Command Theory
The best-known theistic ethical theory is most likely Divine Command theory (DC), or
the view that what God wills defines what is morally good. Perhaps the most famous objection
to this theory was raised by Plato in The Euthyphro: there is no compelling reason to define
moral goodness in terms of God’s will instead of defining God’s will in terms of goodness.

6
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There have been many clever proposals for how to overcome the Euthyphro dilemma, but
DC has never been able to step out of the shadow of the dilemma. Much ink has been spilled
over the issue, and still DC is no better off. Thus I will follow Zagzebski in largely bracketing
DC and exploring alternative theistic foundations for ethical theories.

Zagzebski’s move towards virtue ethics
Early in Divine Motivation Theory Zagzebski highlights three “puzzles” she wishes her
theory to solve. The first puzzle, which she credits to Hume, is that “No representational state
[has] the capacity to motivate.”8 She largely dismisses this problem—and the skepticism it
entails—concluding that the view is “less plausible than what it forces us to give up.”9 The
second puzzle is about the source of value, and whether value exists outside the human mind.
Here she expresses a preference for “a theory that is genuinely distinct from both realism and
antirealism.”10 Her third puzzle is the problem of evil. She places the burden on her theory that it
must naturally lead to the conclusion that a perfectly good, omnipotent God would allow evil to
exist. She later (in Chapters 7 and 8) tests her theory against these puzzles.
Zagzebski evidently believes that some kind of virtue ethic has the best chance of
resolving these puzzles. Building on arguments made by Gary Watson, Zagzebski aims to
develop an “interestingly different” virtue ethics that takes virtue as “intrinsically good and
explanatorily basic.”11 Initially this is a “Motivation-Based Virtue theory” because having
virtuous motivations plays a fundamental role. When Zagzebski subsequently unpacks virtuous
motivations in terms of the emotions had by exemplary people, her theory emerges as a fullfledged “Exemplarist Virtue Theory” (EV).

Exemplarist Virtue Theory
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In her 2010 article “Exemplarist Virtue Theory,” Zagzebski describes the advantages of
EV:
Exemplarist virtue theory has the theoretical simplicity and power of foundationalism
without the problems of a conceptual foundation…Exemplarism puts at the foundation of
the theory a crucial element of moral practice and, indeed, of moral experience: the
identification of persons we admire and whose admirability is something of which we are
confident.12

Here is a brief description of how her approach compares with other ethical theories. To begin
with, we can categorize different ethical theories in terms of the imperatives they make. A
consequentialist ethical theory, for example, can be viewed as requiring us to follow some
version of the utilitarian maxim: e.g., act so as to maximize the benefit to the greatest number of
people. Likewise, a deontological ethical theory can be viewed as requiring us to follow some
version of the categorical imperative: e.g., act in a way that can be universalized. Finally, a virtue
ethics recommends that we act as a virtuous person would — raising the obvious question of
what makes a person virtuous.
Zagzebski’s answer to this question is that a virtuous person has the right emotions in a
particular situation, emotions that give rise to appropriate motivations. When we try to act as a
virtuous person would, this means that we aim to have the same emotional reaction that they
would have; becoming a virtuous person, in other words, is a process of training oneself to
respond emotionally in a certain way. Zagzebski dubs her theory an examplarist virtue theory
because of the importance of moral exemplars. We aim to imitate not some abstract virtuous
person, but some particular person: our exemplar.
To illustrate Zagzebski’s point, consider how we often teach children to act morally. We
may, certainly, encourage them to consider the consequences of their actions, or to think through
some version of the Golden Rule. But we may also, and perhaps more effectively, encourage
12
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them to act like certain well-known exemplars: to be honest like George Washington, to be
selfless like Mother Teresa, to be brave like Joan of Arc. Zagzebski believes that since
“exemplarism gives an important place to narrative ethics within the structure of the theory,” it
has an advantage over other ethical theories.13 More generally, we view morality as more than a
utilitarian cost-benefit analysis or a logical exercise in applying the categorical imperative. We
also expect moral people to have moral emotions: to be outraged by injustice and appreciative of
virtue.
Given well-known problems with other ethical theories, and combined with the initial
plausibility of her approach, an exemplarist virtue theory certainly deserves further examination.

The move from Exemplarist Virtue Theory to Divine Motivation Theory
Zagzebski formulated EV as the secular groundwork for Divine Motivation theory (DM).
She believes that previous attempts to connect God to morality have failed, because morality is
always seen as law—either a law that comes from God’s will (voluntarism), or a law that is
above even God (intellectualism). Zagzebski states that in her alternative, DM, “God is essential
to morality, not because it comes from either his intellect or his will, but because it comes from
his motives.”14 She then claims that “the ultimate paradigm of goodness and the source of value
is God.”15 Therefore, God is the perfect exemplar that should be imitated.

III.

Shortcomings of Exemplarist Virtue Theory

DM does not meet the conditions for an ethical theory
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Zagzebski claims to present a “radical kind of virtue theory.”16 However, her definition of
an ethical theory differs dramatically from the traditional definition (I look at James Rachels’
definition below). Indeed, what Zagzebski calls moral theory is nothing more than an account of
human decision-making. DM is an account of human behavior, one that has emotion at its
foundation. The usual definition of moral theory is that of a theory that somehow explicates what
is right and wrong. DM does not follow this prescription, and therefore is not an ethical theory.
Since it is rather an explanation of human decision-making, DM falls under the realm of
psychology or anthropology, and not philosophy.

Zagzebski’s conditions for an ethical theory
In her article “Exemplarist Virtue Theory,” Zagzebski lists her conditions for an ethical
theory: “I think of a moral theory as an abstract structure that aims to simplify, systematize, and
justify our moral beliefs and practices.”17 She claims it is analogous to a simplified map of the
enormous domain of morality. While this map is not powerful enough to dictate right and wrong,
Zagzebski still gives a few powers to the moral theory: “One of the purposes of the theory is to
justify the practices,” since she claims that moral practices pre-date the theory.18 But one practice
might not fit in with other practices, so you might have to change that practice based on the
theory. Essentially, it sets up a constant tension between theory and practice.
As a response to this objection, Zagzebski points out that “the issue of the relative
priority of theoretical judgments and particular moral judgments is a widely discussed matter in
meta-ethics.”19 Granting that, we are still left with the question as to whether or not DM is truly
an ethical theory, as ethical theories are traditionally defined.

DM fits her conditions
16
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In DM, morality is rooted in emotion. Certain emotions are motive, and motivations that
lead to good actions in turn lead to good outcomes. What makes for a good outcome is
determined by what actions could be expected from one’s moral exemplar. These exemplars,
defined by direct reference, are nothing more than the people (or gods) that others naturally,
instinctively emulate. There is no ethical theory required to move from moral exemplars to good
outcomes, just a theory of human behavior and our natural inclination for imitation.
The only place, then, where an ethical theory could be found in this case would be the
foundation of the theory (what everything else in the theory is defined in terms of): motive
emotions. By saying that emotions are primary, Zagzebski is denying previous moral theories
that claim that either other virtues are primary, or right acts are primary, or “The Good” is
primary.
It is a risky move for no other reason than that motives are diverse and fluid. From what I
understand of her explanation of motive emotions, I do not see how this could serve as a
foundation for any kind of prescriptive moral theory. Others’ definitions of moral theory agree
with this reading.

Traditional philosophical conditions for an ethical theory
In the introduction to Ethical Theory, James Rachels writes:
Ethical theory is customarily divided into two parts. The first part is concerned with the
status of ethics: are there objective moral truths, or is ethics based upon nothing more
than our feelings and social conventions? The second part concerns its content: in the
most general terms, how should we live, and why?20
My main contention is that Zagzebski’s theory fails to tell us why we should live in the way she
describes. To see this, consider how Rachels describes the first part of ethical theory: here he
refers to a “motivational problem” with defending the existence of moral facts, as defined by
20
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Hume. The problem is that “moral beliefs seem to be necessarily motivating,”21 leading Hume to
conclude that “the rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.”22 Since
Zagzebski believes that our motivations are emotions, she would have to agree with Hume that
morality does not come from reason. This idea might be incompatible with her mission to create
a universal moral theory that is compatible with Christian morality. She is left conceding that
Christian moral rules—not just those, but all moral rules—are not conclusions of our reason.
This would make all descriptions of morality as reasonable obsolete.
According to Rachels, “An adequate theory of the nature of ethics must, therefore,
provide a plausible account of the way that reasons support moral judgments. A chief weakness
of emotivism was that it could not do this.”23 This is also a chief weakness of Zagzebski’s DM.

DM does not fit the traditional conditions
To understand how DM is not an ethical theory, but rather an explanation of human
decision-making that is broadly applicable to any (real) ethical theory, consider the following
example. Imagine that a person claiming to follow DM is walking down a hallway in her
building. She is there at an odd hour, so no one else is around. Something catches her eye against
the carpet, and she is surprised to find a $50 bill on the floor. What does she do?
She has an ethical decision to make. According to DM, the process began when she chose
her exemplar. Her emotional response to the situation should mirror that of her exemplar, and
these emotions are the motivations that will cause her to act as her exemplar. Let’s look at a few
scenarios:
•

Scenario 1: The Buddha as exemplar
Always mindful of the teaching of Buddha, she impassively passes the bill by. Money
will not make her happy or bring her peace, nor does it have the power to relieve the
suffering of others.

21
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•

Scenario 2: John Stuart Mill as exemplar
Looking to achieve the most utility, she feels it is her duty to donate the $50 to the
most reputable charity organization she can find.

•

Scenario 3: Karl Marx as exemplar
Wanting to be fair, she gets change for the $50 and distributes it among her workingclass peers.

•

Scenario 4: Immanuel Kant as exemplar
Desiring to be a truly rational being, she consults her categorical imperative. She
concludes that, in order to treat her fellow humans as ends, she must return the $50 to
its original owner.

•

Scenario 5: Jesus as exemplar
Recalling the Golden Rule in Matthew 7:12, she feels sympathy for the person who
lost the bill. She attempts to find the original owner of the bill.

All of these scenarios describe person who lives according to DM. But the resulting
action is no different from a person who follows any of the ethical theories espoused by the
exemplar.
Thus, DM cannot distinguish itself as a unique ethical theory. In her attempt to create a
naturalistic moral framework under which religious ethics can still stand, Zagzebski creates a
kind of meta-ethical theory, under which distinct moral theories can be categorized by following
distinct exemplars.
Zagzebski claims to be describing a “distinctive kind of virtue ethics.” But DM stops
short of being a normative theory, and is merely a description of human motivation to behave
ethically in any ethical theory.

How DM does not fit with the role of a philosopher, according to Zagzebski
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Zagzebski explains that the purpose of the philosopher is to answer the question: can
morality exist outside of a religious framework?24 She attempts to do so in the first half of her
book, Divine Motivation Theory, by presenting EV as a universal moral theory. However, in
trying to generalize ethical decision making, her theory becomes merely an explanation of
human imitative behavior, which is not the job of a philosopher. Her theory is missing the
“ought” that is pivotal to moral theory. The question, then, remains unanswered.

What determines who is a “good person”?
In her 2010 article, Zagzebski wrote, “It is an advantage of the theory that what makes a
good person good is not given a priori but is determined empirically.” The theory has the
empirical determination built into its workings: “these concepts [the good, a right act, and a
virtue], as well as the concepts of a duty and a good life, are determined by reference to
exemplars, which are identified directly through the emotion of admiration” (emphasis
added).25 I find it doubtful that the “emotion of admiration” can be considered reliable empirical
evidence for how to live one’s life.
She says later in the 2010 article:
I assume that our emotion of admiration is generally trustworthy, but I do not assume that
we always trust it. When we do, we take the object of admiration to be admirable. A
person who is admirable in some respect is imitable in that respect. This is rough because
there are many reasons why we do not or cannot imitate the admirable. But the feeling of
admiration is a kind of attraction that carries with it the impetus to imitate. The ways in
which the exemplar are admirable, and hence imitable, can be used to give us both a way
of understanding significant moral concepts and a way of using those concepts as a way
of making ourselves and our lives conform to the admirable.26
24
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There are a few troubling parts to this summary of exemplarist moral theory. First,
consider the concept of trustworthy emotions. Zagzebski gives no basis for trusting our emotion
of admiration. In fact, she says the opposite: “The emotions of different people in the same
situation often differ. This suggests, but does not force us to the conclusion, that most of the time
our emotions are wrong.”27 Emotions are not the kinds of things that stay constant over time, or
from person to person. We should therefore expect our exemplars (along with our moral theory)
to change over time, and to lack universality, it would seem. But Zagzebski, not wanting to be
led to that conclusion, suggests instead that, “it is probably not very useful, either for practical or
theoretical purposes, to judge that most emotions are wrong.”28 Again, emotions are all we can
use to choose exemplars. This seems to lead to the conclusion that her theory is based on illusory
assumptions rather than reality.
In addition to the question of how an exemplar can be labeled as a “good person” is the
question of how someone following EV or DM can be labeled as a “good person.” Since
Zagzebski takes emotions to be an “intrinsic,” “basic, non-derivative good,” and that “the
emotions of an exemplary good person […] are part of what makes the person good,”29 it would
seem only reasonable that, according to EV, good emotions make a person good. But Zagzebski
again takes the explanation in a different direction, saying:
I do not intend the sense in which emotions are right or wrong to be a specifically moral
sense of right or wrong, and for the most part there is no reason to blame those whose
emotions are wrong or to feel guilty when one’s own emotions are wrong.30
She concludes only that “the exemplar’s emotions are intrinsically motivating states that fit their
objects,” and that makes emotions “good in the same way that true belief is good,” in an
apparently amoral way. Without using emotions to judge whether a person is good or bad, or
behaving in a moral fashion, I am left wondering how one judges moral goodness in EV or DM.
27
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What determines a right or wrong action?
Looking at actions to determine what is morally good in EV or DM is equally
unenlightening, as Zagzebski is always pointing back to motive emotions. “The good of
outcomes derives from good motives, which is to say, the motives of paradigmatically good
persons.”31 The good does not derive from the action or from the consequence, but rather from
the motive. At face value, this bears some resemblance to Kant’s ethics in that, in order to
evaluate the good of one’s action, one must look internally, to the motive or reason for one’s
action, rather than externally, to the results of one’s actions. This seems to be a very personal
matter, as no one else can truly know your motives. However, since I have just shown that
Zagzebski also does not allow motive emotions to determine what is good, we are left with no
moral metric once again.
One of the interesting aspects of Zagzebski’s EV theory is that it does not prescribe one
set of actions—it is not universal. The morally right action depends on what exemplar one
chooses, which Zagzebski believes will usually lead you to the same action, since most ethical
theories have some overlap. But, as demonstrated with the scenarios presented earlier, the right
action depends on whom one chooses as an exemplar. It is only when everyone agrees on one
exemplar that the actions prescribed by the ethical theory become universal.

God’s Emotions: The move from EV to DM
Putting the issues with the judgments of value aside, it is important to look at how
emotions track in the transition from EV to DM. In order for DM to be feasible at all, Zagzebski
needs to claim that God has something akin to emotional states. It is not widely accepted that
God has emotional states, so she has some convincing to do here. Zagzebski begins by
presenting her suspicion that the reason that God is often denied any emotionality is not
theological, but rather can be traced back to the pre-Socratics.32

31
32
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But even Zagzebski cannot accept that God is capable of all emotions, because she
rejects those that “seem to imply defect,” such as fear, hope, jealousy and hatred.33 Interestingly,
two of those emotions are attributed to God in traditional biblical translations.34 This
inconsistency suggests to me that the issue of God’s emotionality is a more complex issue than
Zagzebski would like to admit. She does not explore that question as to whether emotions are
God’s motives, but concludes that, “Either way, God’s motives and virtues can have the function
that Divine Motivation theory says they have.”35 This is a shaky, unsubstantiated transition to
DM, since the entire foundation of EV was emotions as motives for moral actions!

IV.

A theistically based alternative to Divine Motivation Theory

Zagzebski takes on an awesome task when trying to propose a theistically based moral
theory, built from a naturalistic framework, that can stand with other, well-established ethical
theories of our time. While I believe her attempt has some major flaws, her goal is nonetheless
worthy of pursuit. Thus, I will now outline my own approach to ethics and ethical decisionmaking, an approach that may lead to a theistically based moral theory that avoids some of the
problems present in DM that I have outlined.
Unlike Zagzebski, I do not wish to start by presenting a naturalistic framework. I believe
that any theistically based moral theory is just that—based in God, and not in naturalism. So we
shall look there first. And being perhaps more versed in theology than philosophy proper, I shall
start with a very basic theological concept: God is love. The virtue of love is not just
fundamental to the character of God, but it summarizes his character. Zagzebski acknowledges
the fundamental character of love, in the context of her own theory, and points out that, “The
33
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35
Linda Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory, Cambridge Universty Press, 2004. Page 205.
34

15

motive that is most clearly divine according to the Christian tradition is love. Motives such as
mercy, forgiveness, generosity, and loyalty derive from the central motive of love.”36 Since we
are very concerned with what is fundamental when building a moral theory, let us turn away
from all those other “motives” and look only at love.
I would like to distinguish my use of the word love from what Zagzebski means when she
says love. Zagzebski uses love as just another motive emotion, something that is had by an agent,
is felt toward an intentional object, and that places an intentional object under a thick affective
concept.37 I do not wish to use love as a motive emotion, and I do not wish to even say that love
is a motive. Love has a motive, and of course an object, but it is an action. Love is selflessness
acted upon in the best interest of the beloved. Love of many different categories of things is
valuable, but I believe the most fundamental objects of love are persons.
Zagzebski claims that, “In DM theory, God’s primary motivation toward his creation is
love.”38 This is the essential reason why personhood is valued: not because it is somehow
intrinsically good, but because the development of personhood is motivated by love, according to
Zagzebski. In the language of DM, one should love persons because God first had the motive
emotion of love towards persons.39 In the language of my own theory, love of persons is
synonymous with moral actions.
In Christian ethics, you could call the love of persons the most fundamental moral law.
Jesus said:
‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all
your mind.’ This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it:
‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’ All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two
commandments.40

36
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This could perhaps cause us to circle back to a kind of DC, but I do not believe this theory
suffers from the Euthyphro dilemma in the same way that DC does. In my theory, one can
simply answer the dilemma by saying that we must love because God commands love, but it is
not arbitrary and he could not command otherwise because God is love.
Generalizing this into a naturalistic ethical theory inclines me towards Kant’s Kingdom
of Ends. Kant’s deontological theory relies on reason rather than emotion in ethical decisionmaking. Since I have defined love as a kind of selfless action, I believe that any action which
would be legislated in the kingdom of ends would be an action that, in the meantime, would be
done out of selfless interests.

IV.

Conclusion
I believe EV fails on many fronts, mainly because Zagzebski does not do enough work in

explaining how people, actions, or motives can be judged as right or wrong. Her move to make
emotions primary is bold, and I believe not entirely unfounded, as it seems that emotion could
supply the proper motivation for moral action. However, her account of ethical decision-making
and moral action appears more and more descriptive the more it is examined. In this way, the EV
description of moral action could be seen as the psychological description of ethical decisionmaking in any ethical theory.
The move from EV to DM could have been more graceful. After spending a significant
amount of time explaining how emotions are fundamental because they are good, motivating,
and help us choose exemplars, Zagzebski undermines much of her own work by claiming that we
should not always trust our emotions, and that it is not important that God have emotions. She
gives well-thought-out reasons for her motivation in crafting EV and DM, as well as most of her
smaller steps along the way. But all of the pieces do not fit together as well as she could have
hoped.
My outline takes some of Zagzebski’s thoughts to heart, but it avoids making emotion
primary. It is fundamentally a theistic moral theory, but its implementation is similar to Kant’s
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Kingdom of Ends. It is another attempt at making a theistically based moral theory that could
enhance the discussion.
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